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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SEAN THOMPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
. CaseNo.20000071-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1999). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah Code Annotated 76-9-201 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied? 
A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Mohi, 901 P. 2d 991,995 (Utah 1995). Moreover, this Court should apply "strict scrutiny" 
to this case as it impacts freedom of speech as located in the and First Amendment. See, St. George 
v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929,932 (Utah 1993). 
1 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in the 
jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to annoy, alarm 
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten harass, or frighten any person at the called 
number or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person: 
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues; 
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues, or 
after having been told not call back, causes the telephone of another to ring 
repeatedly or continuously; 
(c) makes a telephone cal and insults, taunts, or challenges the recipient of the 
telephone call or any person at the called number in a manner likely to 
provoke a violent or disorderly response; 
(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or profane language or suggests 
any lewd or lacivious act; or 
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical harm, or 
damage to any person or the property of any person. 
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor. 
United States Constitution, Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
....No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person, of life 
liberty or property, without due process flaw; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 
2 
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Utah Constitution, Article I, § 15 
No person shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Sean P. Thompson appeals from a bench trial conviction of Telephone Harassment, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201, as adopted by Provo City. 
A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court 
On or about May 1, 1999, Thompson was charged by Information with Telephone 
Harassment, a class B misdemeanor, in Fourth District Court, Provo Department. 
On October 29, 1999, a bench trial was held before the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield. 
After testimony from the alleged victim, the responding officer, and Thompson, the Court ruled in 
favor of the City of Provo and convicted Thompson of telephone harassment. On December 20, 
1999, Thomson was sentenced to 15 hours of community service and a $250 fine. On January 19, 
2000, Thompson filed a notice of appeal in the Fourth District Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In the bench trial the alleged victim, Ms. Thayer, testified that Thompson called numerous 
times within the hour.(Tr. At 7). Thayer testified that she asked Thompson to cease his phone 
calls.(Tr. At 8) The responding police officer, Bastian, testified that while he was at the home of 
Thayer investigating the telephone calls, Thompson again called, wherein Bastian picked up the 
receiver and spoke with Thompson.(Tr. at 13). Bastian requested to meet with Thompson at 
Thompson's home.(Tr. at 14). Upon arriving at Thompson5 s home Bastian indicated that he smelled 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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alcohol and Thompson admitted to drinking beer.(Tr. at 14). 
Thompson took the stand and testified that he received a telephone call from Thayer and she 
told Thompson that she was going to harm herself (suicide) and possibly harm Thompson's 
daughter.'(Tr. at 17 & 20). Thompson testified that he called Thayer numerous times because he 
feared Thayer was a danger to herself and to Thompson's daughter.(Tr. at 21). Thompson repeatedly 
called Thayer because he was taught in school to keep calling to assist the person threatening 
suicide.(Tr. at 20). 
Mr. Means was appointed to be defense counsel for Mr. Thompson by the 4th District Court 
in May, 1999. Mr. Means told Mr. Thompson that he would be in contact with him in order to 
prepare for the trial which was to be held in October 1999. Over the months before trial, Mr. Means 
never called Mr. Thompson, in fact the only contact was initiated by a worried Mr. Thompson a few 
days before he was to be back in court. Instead of immediately meeting with his client to prepare 
his case, Mr. Means asked Mr. Thompson to meet with him at the courthouse about half and hour 
before they were to appear before the court for the trial. Mr. Thompson arrived early, and waited 
for his attorney, and Mr. Means showed up with only a few minutes before they were to be in court. 
As they were reviewing a few factual issues in preparation for trial, they were called into the 
courtroom unprepared. 
In meeting with Mr. Means, the Appellant, Mr. Thompson provided substantial evidence that 
would support his innocence. Mr. Thompson had evidence of a prior occasion in which Ms. Thayer 
threatened to kill herself and all passengers and all the passengers who were with her while she was 
driving a car. Mr. Thompson felt that this evidence would surely have an impact on the trial, 
1
 The alleged victim and Thompson were recently divorced and are parents of a daughter. 
4 
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tending to prove that Mr. Thompson was indeed acting with the best of intentions to prevent anyone 
from getting hurt by repeatedly calling Ms. Thayer while she was contemplating suicide. Mr. Means 
did not use this evidence to impeach Ms. Thayer when she claimed that she had never been suicidal 
in her life. (Tr. at 27). 
Mr. Thompson had evidence that he called Ms. Thayer only in response to her initial call to 
him. His return calls were only due to the call which was first made to him. During trial, Ms. Thayer 
claimed that she did not call Mr. Thompson on the night in question. (Tr. at 10). She later admitted 
that she did indeed call Mr. Thompson that day. (Tr. at 27). 
Due to the lack of evidence and lack of effort on the part of Mr. Means, Mr. Thompson was 
found guilty of telephone harassment. (Tr. at 33). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since the Utah Court of Appeals has declared applicable sections of Utah Code Annotated 
§76-9-201 unconstitutional, Thompson asks that this Court reverse the conviction. The facts of this 
case provide standing for Thompson to challenge the telephone harassment statute's 
constitutionality. The telephone harassment statute in this case has a real and substantial deterrent 
effect on protected speech and a court's narrowing construction of the statute is not possible. 
Because the statute is overbroad and vague it must be stricken down because it violates the 
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as 
Article I, §§ 7 and 15 of the Utah Constitution. Given the above the telephone harassment statute 
cannot be applied to Thompson or anyone else. 
5 
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Appellant Sean Thompson was denied due process by the poor effort put forth by Mr. Means 
as his defense attorneys who was appointed to defend the Appellant. Mr. Means failed to contact 
Mr. Thompson as promised. 
Mr. Means also failed to consider or prepare any kind of defense on his behalf. Mr. Means 
disregarded the considerable amount of evidence that Mr. Thompson brought to his attention 
regarding a different occasion in which Ms. Thayer threatened suicide and homicide. Mr. Means, 
though bound by a duty to do so, did not investigate this evidence. 
When Ms. Thayer claimed that she had never been suicidal (Tr. at 27), Mr. Means, though 
he had been informed of her prior bad act, failed to attempt to impeach her by bringing up her prior 
threats. In addition, after the State's principal witness for its case in chief gave contradictory 
statements from the stand, Mr. Means did not even try to impeach the witness. Such a blatant failure 
to render effective assistance of counsel constitutes a severe infringement on Mr. Thompson's right 
to counsel and due process. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THOMPSON'S CONVICTION OF TELEPHONE HARASSMENT SHOULD 
BE REVERSED BECAUSE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §76-9-201 HAS BEEN 
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED 
Recently this court has ruled on the issue of Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 in Provo City 
v. Whatcott. Provo v. Whatcott. 1 P.3d 1113, (Ut. App. 2000). In Whatcott, this court ruled that 
provisions within Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 are overbroad, Id. at 6. A statute that is 
determined to be unconstitutional on its face must be stricken down in its entirety, disallowing the 
statute to be applied against Thompson or anyone else. Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d at 
6 
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459(Utah 1989); Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d at 1377(Utah App. 1990). Given this court's recent 
ruling, which is on point, Thompson's conviction should be reversed. 
In General 
Speech is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as 
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution.2 
D. Standing 
A defendant has "general standing" when he can show " 'some distinct and palpable injury 
that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.' " Willden, 768 P2d. at 456 
(quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)). Thompson was convicted under 
Utah's telephone harassment statute demonstrating he "indisputably has standing to challenge the 
ordinance, at least as it has been applied to him." Willden, 768 P.2d at 457. 
Thompson also has standing to challenge the statute on its face as to the statute's 
constitutional validity. A statute may be held facially invalid even if it can be applied legitimately 
in the facts of this particular case. Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah App. 1990). Upon 
a determination that the statute is unconstitutional on its face the statute must be stricken down in 
its entirety, disallowing the statute to be applied against Thompson or anyone else. Willden, 768 
P.2d at 459; Huber, 786 P.2d at 1377. 
Generally, a person may not challenge the facial validity of a statute on grounds that it may 
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others not before the court. State v. Haig, 578 P. 2d 
2Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution provides in part "No law shall be passed to 
abridge or restrain the freedom of speech ...." and has been interpreted as granting at least as 
much protection as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.. KUTV, Inc. v. 
Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983). 
7 
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837, 841 (Utah 1978). However, this is not so when we are dealing with First Amendment 
protections. The First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness standing doctrines represent a 
departure from the traditional rule. The doctrines are designed to give standing to anyone who is 
subject to an overbroad or vague statute that chills the exercise of First Amendment rights of others. 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521,92 S.Ct. 1103,1105, 31 L.Ed.2d 408; Willden, 768 P.2d at 
457. The doctrine "gives a defendant standing to challenge a statute on behalf of others not before 
the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the defendant." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 
935,P.2d 1259,1263n.2(Ut.Ct. App. 1997);SeeBigelowv. Virginia, 421 U.S.809,816,95S.Ct. 
222,2230,44 L.Ed.2d600 (1975);Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612,93 S. Ct. 2908,2916, 
37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 840 (Utah 1978). The rationale for this 
exception is that the First Amendment rights infringed upon are so important that their protection 
need not wait for the perfect litigant. Willden, 768 P.2d at 457. Hence, a defendant does have 
standing to challenge the statute on grounds of both unconstitutional overbreadth and vagueness as 
applied to others. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 521,92 S. Ct. at 1105. When faced with First Amendment 
overbreadth and vagueness attacks on a statute, this Court should first address overbreadth. Logan 
City v. Huber, 786 P. 2d 1372,1375 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
B. Overbreadth 
The Supreme Court has stated that when a statute or ordinance aims at penalizing an 
unprotected class of speech, it "must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish 
only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression." Gooding, 
405 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 1106; See Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375. The constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of speech do not allow the government to punish words outside of "narrowly limited classes 
8 
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of speech." Huber 786 P.2d at 1374. An overbroad enactment is one "'which does not aim 
specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control, but, on the contrary, sweeps within its 
ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or 
the press.' " Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,97,60 S.Ct. 736, 
741-42, 84 L.Ed. 1093(1940)). 
The merit of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge is determined by analyzing two 
factors: (1) Whether the statute's " 'deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and 
substantial;': and (2) Whether the statute is ' readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state 
courts.5 " State v. Haig 578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
All U.S. 205,216,95 S.Ct. 2268,2276,45 L.Ed,2d 125(1975)). If the statute's deterrent effect on 
protected expression is both real and substantial and the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing 
construction by state courts then it is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
1. Substantial Deterrent Effect. 
Utah's telephone harassment statute has a real and substantial deterrent effect on protected 
speech. For example, the statute precludes one from making a telephone call with intent to "alarm" 
another. The deterrent effect of this language on constitutionally protected speech has no limits. 
This overbroad choice of words conceivably makes it criminal in Utah to call one's neighbor and 
warn him that his house is on fire, or to call a friend and forecast an approaching storm. See Bolles 
v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (Col.' 1975) (en banc). 
The statute also precludes one from making a telephone call with intent to "annoy" another. 
There are many instances where one may call another with the intention of causing a slight 
annoyance for perfectly legitimate constitutionally protected purposes. Conceivably, this statute 
9 
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could make criminal a single telephone call made by the following individuals: a consumer who 
wishes to express dissatisfaction over the performance of a produce or service; a businessman 
disturbed with another's failure to perform a contractual obligation; an irate citizen who wishes to 
complain to a public official; an individual bickering over family matters; or a creditor seeking to 
collect payment of a past due bill. See People v. Klick. 362 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (111. 1977). 
The term "harass"3 as used in the statute is merely a persistent annoyance and should be 
considered on the same guidelines as "annoy". Conceivably, this statute could make criminal 
repeated telephone calls made by the following individuals: a consumer who wishes to express 
dissatisfaction over the performance of a produce or service that continues to fail after being 
repaired. Indeed the "lemon laws" to handle such situations expect the dissatisfaction of a consumer 
who expresses dissatisfaction on more than one occasion.; a businessman disturbed with another's 
failure to perform a contractual obligation after being told once of the dissatisfaction but because of 
no change behavior must call back and "harass"; or even a person/therapist/police officer attempting 
to stop a suicide and calling back to ensure the person does not harm herself. 
The first Amendment is made of "sterner stuff." Bolles, P.2d at 83. The people of Utah must 
not live in continual fear that something they say over the telephone with intent to "annoy", "harass", 
"offend ", or "alarm" the listener will invoke the statute. Free speech may best fulfill its high 
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with present conditions or even 
stirs people to anger. Coxv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,551-52,85 S.Ct. 453,462-63,13 L.Ed.2d471 
(1965). 
3
 Meriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, "Harass - lb - annoy 
persistently." 
10 
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Unquestionably, the State of Utah has a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting its 
residents from fear and abuse at the hands of persons who employ the telephone to torment others. 
United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir. 1978); Klick, 362 N.E.2d at 331. The State 
also has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of its residents' homes from the intrusion of 
unwanted and perverse phone calls. City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1984). However, the means chosen by the legislature to address these interests sweep to broadly. 
Clearly, the legislature failed in its duty to employ the least drastic means available to achieve these 
purposes. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488, 81 S.Ct. 247,252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). 
First of all, Utah's telephone harassment statute is not limited to intrusions into the home. 
Furthermore, it is not limited to communications which abuse the listener "in an essentially 
intolerable manner" as required by the Constitution when the government seeks to "shut off 
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21, 91 S.Ct. 
1780,1786,29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). Plainly, the statute lacks the "precision of regulation" required 
by a statute "so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACPv. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438, 
83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d (405) (1963). Thus, the deterrent effect of the statute on legitimate 
speech is both real and substantial. 
2. Narrowing Judicial Construction. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the 
State's courts. While Utah courts favor construing a law so as to carry out its legislative intent and 
avoiding constitutional conflicts, it will not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain intent. Provo City 
Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455,458 (Utah 1989); Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,1262 (Ut, 
Ct. App. 1997); Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372,1377 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). One may argue that 
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the statue should be narrowly construed to prohibit phone calls made "with intent to annoy, alarm 
... or frighten any person ...," but only when made for no lawful purpose. While such a narrowing 
construction of the statute may eliminate some of its constitutional inadequacies, it is clear that the 
legislature did not intend to qualify the statute in that manner. In 1994, the statute was amended to 
delete the words "without purpose of lawful communications." Hence, narrowly construing the 
statute to apply only in situations where the phone call was made for now lawful purpose would do 
"impermissible violence to the clear language of the ordinance," Willden, 768 P.2d at 45 8, and would 
be contrary to the legislature's plain intent. 
3. Examples of Overbroad Telephone Harassment Statutes: 
Several courts have held statutes similar to the one at issue here to be unconstitutional on 
grounds of overbreadth. E.g., People v. Klick, 362 N.E. 2d 329 (111. 1977); Bolles v. People, 541 
P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (en banc); City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). The 
language of these statutes and Utah's statute is clearly distinguishable from the narrowly tailored 
telephone harassment statutes that were upheld in Iowa v. Jaeger, 249 N.W. 2d 688 (Iowa 1977), 
Jones v. Municipality of Anchorage, 754 P.2d 275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), and Arizona v. Hagen, 
558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). Similar to Utah's statute, these statutes specified the intent with 
which the call must be made; however, contrary to Utah's statute, these valid statutes also specify 
the nature of the speech prohibited (e.g., obscene, lewd, profane, and threatening).4 The categories 
of language prohibited by these statues are consistent with those held to be unprotected by the 
"The statues upheld in Jaeger and Hagen read as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any 
person, with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, to telephone another 
and use obscene, lewd or profane language or suggest any lewd or lascivious act, or threat to in 
flict injury or physical harm to the person or property of any person" (emphasis added). 
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Constitution in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568? 572, 625 S.Ct. 766,769,86 L.Ed.1031 
(1942). Subsections 1(a) and (b) of Utah's telephone harassment statute, on the other hand, make 
no attempt to specify the nature of speech prohibited. As in the case at hand subsections (a) and (b) 
directly apply. 
C. Vagueness 
If this Court determines that Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 is unconstitutionally 
overbroad, it may be held facially invalid and this Court need not even address the vagueness 
challenge. However, if the overbreadth challenge fails then this Court should next examine the facial 
vagueness challenge. Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375,1377 n.13 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
Virtually every potentially vague term used in Utah's telephone harassment statute has been 
challenged in one State or another. The court's decisions have been anything but consistent.5 
Usually, however, statutes containing similarly vague terms such as "annoy" and "alarm" or "lewd" 
and "profane" are upheld by the courts. This is largely due to the clarifying effects of other statutory 
elements or because of the willingness of courts to impose narrowing judicial constructions on the 
terms; the survival of the statutes can hardly be attributed to the precision of the terms themselves. 
M. Sean Royall, Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory 
Precision, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1403,1412 (Fall 1989). The Case of State v. L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 
5Compare, e.g., State v. Sanderson, 575 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), City of 
Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), and People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 
1261,1266 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (statues containing the phrase "alarms or seriously annoys" 
were found void for vagueness; with Kinney v. State. 404 N.E. 2d 49, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) and 
Donley v. City of Mountain Brook, 429 S.2d 603, 611 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982) (upholding two 
nearly identical statutes). 
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131 (Utah 1982), is an example of the Utah Supreme Court applying such a narrowing construction 
on the term "lewdness" to avoid its inherent vagueness. 
While there is no hard and fast rule indicating which words are vague and which ones are not, 
one may look to the purposes of the vagueness doctrine to determine whether the terms used in the 
statute at hand are indeed vague. The vagueness doctrine declares a law unconstitutional if persons 
"' of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' " 
U.S. v. Lanier, _ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Connolly v. 
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,391,46 S.Ct. 126,127,70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). The doctrine 
reflects the principle that no person should be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could 
not reasonably understand to be forbidden. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1225. The reasons for the doctrine 
are three fold. Two of those reasons address Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns and the 
third addresses First amendment interests: 
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct we 
insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them . . . . Third but 
related, where a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms 
it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. 
Graynedv. CityofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,108-09,92 S. Ct. 2294 2298-99-33 L.Ed.2d 222(1972); 
See West Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613,615 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993). 
With regard to the First Amendment vagueness concerns, the Supreme Court has intimated 
that "stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a 
potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because 
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the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." Smithv. California, 361 U.S. 147,151, 80 S.Ct. 
215, 217-18, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1960). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 prohibits an actor from using a telephone to "annoy, alarm 
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten any person at the called number, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof ...." Consequently, a caller could be prosecuted for espousing 
Catholic doctrine that offends a Mormon recipient, or for frightening a child at the called number 
who might overhear [e.g., through a speaker phone] a discussion of frightening scenes from 
Hannibal, or alarm a neighbor by informing him about a proposed property tax increase, or harass 
a friend by suggesting he will be whipped at the next game of pick-up neighborhood basketball, and 
so on, and so on, and so on .... The all encompassing language of the statute's specific intent 
provisions does not put one on adequate notice of when the content of a single call might be 
prohibited. When can one probe religious doctrine before the recipient is offended such that the call 
becomes criminal? Is it a crime if a child at the called number is frightened by a discussion of one's 
war experience? How does a caller know where to draw the line when calling about political topics 
which might alarm the listener" This statute simply does not provide one with a fair and 
understandable warning of when a crime will occur and how to avoid committing it. 
The vagueness doctrine also exists to prevent arbitrary law enforcement and to prevent the 
inhibition of First Amendment freedoms. In fact, the requirement that a legislature establish ckar 
guidelines to govern law enforcement is more important that providing fair notice. Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); See Greenwood v. 
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 716, 819 (Utah 1991). The lack of clear guidelines in the 
telephone harassment statute (ordinance) gives law enforcement unbounded discretion to apply the 
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vague law selectively and also subjects the exercise of free speech to an unascertainable standard. 
Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174,178 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Lastly, because they may not know what exactly it means to "annoy", "harass", "alarm", or 
"offend" another, citizens of Utah may inhibit their speech to avoid the risk of being victimized by 
arbitrary law enforcement. Since a statute that is capable of reaching First Amendment freedoms 
demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts, the statute should be stricken on 
vagueness grounds. Smith, 361 U.S. at 151, 80 S. Ct. at 217-18. 
If this Court determines that the statute is facially vague, it may cure the statute's vagueness 
by instructing the jury in a way that sufficiently limits the meaning of the statute. Kramer, 712 F.2d 
at 178, n. 6. For example, the court may clearly define for the jury what it means to "annoy", 
"harass", "alarm", or to "offend" another and precisely what "lewd" or "profane" language is. In 
fact, a court is "obliged to seek to construe a criminal statute to give specific content to terms that 
might otherwise be unconstitutionally vague." State v. L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1982). If 
the statute, as authoritatively construed by the court, passes constitutional scrutiny then it will not 
be overturned on vagueness grounds. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73, 62 S. 
Ct., 766, 769-770, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). However, as argued above, the terms "lewd", 
"lascivious", and "profane", even if adequately defined for the jury, have no application to the facts 
of this case. Additionally, the terms "annoy", "harass", "alarm", and "offend" are not susceptible 
to one comprehensive definition that fits all factual settings but have different thresholds for different 
persons in different settings. For instance, loud and raucous music may be acceptable at a rock 
concert or in the privacy of some people's homes; but the same music may be offensive in other 
people's homes or in funeral or religious settings. "Annoy", "harass", "alarm", and "offend" will 
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I 
likely have different meanings to each member of a jury, notwithstanding the Court's attempts at 
achieving defining instructions. 
II. MR. THOMPSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN VIOLATED DUE TO 
GROSSLY INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is the basis for the right of a Defendant 
to have effective assistance of counsel. Utah courts have consistently relied on the ruling of 
Strickland v. Washington when deciding claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel under the 
Federal Constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct 2052,80 L Ed2d 674 (1984). 
(See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994); State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993); State 
v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah), cert denied, 497 U.S. 
1024,110 S.Ct. 3270 (1989); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989); Fernandez v. Cook, 783 
P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) \ State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989); Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1988); State v,. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986)). 
Strickland established a two-prong test in determining whether counsel for a defendant was 
ineffective: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 
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State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, at 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 687) (emphasis added). Both prongs of the test must be met for a court to affirm a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, when a defendant is represented by more than one 
attorney the courts review the actions of all attorneys as a single representation when evaluating 
ineffective assistance claims. State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, at 1254 (Utah 1993). 
A. Defense Counsel's Performance Was Deficient. 
The first prong of the Strickland test is met by defendant "show[ing] that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In 
this regard, the Utah Supreme Court has held, "[i]f counsel does not adequately investigate the 
underlying facts of a case, including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's 
performance cannot fall within the 'wide range of reasonable professional assistance5." 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Templin Court has stated that "a decision 
not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision." Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (emphasis 
added). In proving counsel's representation fell below an objective standard, Appellant cite's 
specific instances of ineffectiveness which resulted in defendant not presenting an adequate defense 
at trial. 
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct outline how an attorney should act in relation to a 
client's case. "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client." URPC 1.3 (1981). "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." URPC 1.4(a) (1981). Mr. 
Means did not even attempt to contact Appellant before the trial, this is contrary to his duty as a 
licensed attorney. 
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Mr. Means had reason to, but failed to investigate the issue of other threats made by Ms. 
Thayer since Mr. Thompson shared information with Mr. Means in that regard. A simple 
investigation would have given Appellant a great advantage in his case, proving that his intent in 
calling Ms. Thayer was done with the purpose of protecting her. 
1. Lack of investigation is prima facie ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Only after an adequate inquiry is made can counsel make a reasonable decision to call or not 
to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. Templin, 805 P.2d at 188. 
If defense counsel would have investigated the case, ample evidence would have been found 
to prove that Ms. Thayer had indicated suicidal tendencies before, thereby giving Mr. Thompson the 
incentive to repeatedly call Ms. Thayer in order to protect her, and to protect Mr. Thompson's child. 
Mr. Means, failed to consider the evidence that was proffered by Mr. Thompson, and was 
thereby directly hindering Mr. Thompson's possibility of obtaining a fair trial. This disregard for 
the client's interest, and failure to investigate is surely an issue that would have reversed the 
conviction in this case. 
2. Counsel failed to attempt to impeach Ms. Thayer. 
In representing a client, if an action by counsel is "below an objective standard for 
reasonableness" (Strickland, Supra at 688 ) it is grounds for finding that counsel was ineffective in 
representing the client. See Strickland, Supra. According to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, 
an attorney is held to the strict duty of providing competent representation. See URPC 1.1 (1981). 
The direct contradiction between Ms. Thayer's statement that she did not call Appellant on 
the day in question (Tr. at 10), and the admitting that she had called him (Tr. at 27) was an obvious 
indication of impeachment testimony. To fail to point out such a blatant contradiction in testimony 
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is below the standard for reasonableness, and is unacceptable. This is especially true since the other 
evidence offered by Mr. Thompson would have 
B, The Deficient Performance Prejudiced Mr. Thompson. 
Mr. Thompson was found guilty of telephone harassment. (Tr. at 33). In ruling, the Judge 
stated his view, "I think the only clear evidence is that there was an intent to annoy." (Tr. at 33). This 
would have been directly disproved had defense counsel investigated, and presented evidence 
tending to indicate that Ms. Thayer had dangerous propensities. The intent would have also been 
disproved had defense counsel used the prior death threat made by Ms. Thayer to impeach her while 
on the stand. 
The error of failing to attempt to impeach, like the error of failing to investigate is not 
harmless. It was prejudicial to not attempt to impeach Ms. Thayer because "such strong 
impeachment evidence would go to the central issue of the case..." State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 975, 
979 (Utah 1999). The issue of Ms. Thayer's mental condition as pertaining to Mr. Thompson's 
intent was directly at issue. The failure to expose the evidence of a 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Thompson requests that this Court reverse the conviction given the ruling of Provo v. 
Whatcott, finding Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 to be unconstitutional. Thompson has standing 
to challenge the constitutionality of the telephone harassment statute as applied to the facts of his 
case. He also has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on its face. The subject 
statute has a real and substantial deterrent effect on protected speech and the statute is not readily 
subject to a narrowing construction by the state's courts; therefore, it is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
Additionally, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and cannot be cured by a narrowing judicial 
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construction by the state's courts. Because the statute is overbroad and vague it must be stricken 
down because it violates the guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
as well as Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution of Utah, and it cannot be applied to defendant or 
anyone else. 
Appellant's right of due process has been infringed by ineffective assistance of the counsel 
that was appointed to him to represent his case. Appellant's counsel failed to adequately represent 
him by inquiring sufficiently to offer evidence in support of his clam that Ms. Thayer had suicidal 
tendencies, and that his calls were made in with good intentions. Appellant's attorney also failed 
to diligently pursue the case since he failed to even make contact with the Appellant to ensure 
efficient preparation to defend against the charge of telephone harassment. Additionally, defense 
counsel was incompetent by not attempting to impeach Ms. Thayer based on her openly 
contradictory statements. 
Respectfully submitted this j_(_day of May, 2001. 
^ A N A M. FACEMYER 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Addendum 
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There is no addendum required in support of this brief. 
• 
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